INTRODUCTION
The internationally recognized doctrine of the "principle of legality" requires the existence of enforceable law before a person can be held criminally liable for their conduct. 1 The doctrine is prescribed in Article 27 of the Afghan Constitution, which states the following:
No deed shall be considered a crime unless ruled by a law 2 promulgated prior to commitment of the offense. No one shall be pursued, arrested, or detained without due process of law. No one shall be punished without the decision of an authoritative court taken in accordance with the provisions of the law, promulgated prior to commitment of the offense. When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws 4 regarding ruling on an issue, the court's decisions shall be within the limits of this Constitution in compliance with Hanafî jurisprudence and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner. 5 Thus, Article 130 grants the judiciary the right to turn to Hanafi jurisprudence for guidance in cases when the court finds an injustice or inequity, but there is no applicable, relevant provision of statute in the Afghan Constitution or statutes. 6 The need for action under Tazir arises when the social norm opposes conduct where there is no established legal norm.
In over a thousand cases since 2004, judges have used this provision to justify holding defendants criminally liable where no crime has been defined by an enacted statute. 7 For example, in the western Herat province of Afghanistan, a primary criminal court convicted and sentenced three men for selling dog meat. 8 The court sentenced two of them to 15 years imprisonment and another, an accomplice, was sentenced to three years in prison. 9 In other reports, 80 out of 100 women who were incarcerated in the Kabul PulCharkhi Prison had been convicted of having run away from home. 10 However, selling dog meat and running away from home are not crimes under the Afghan Penal Code. Despite the fact that Article 130 4 As discussed above, the term "laws" is not an accurate translation of the Pashto/Dari version of the official Constitution of Afghanistan: the exact word is "statutes. 
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189 Toward a Unified Interpretation of Article 130 to the Afghan Constitution allows some judicial discretion, this practice of disregarding the principle of legality and holding individuals criminally liable for crimes and punishments that exist only in Islamic law violates Article 27 of the Afghan Constitution and contravenes constitutional provisions that protect individual rights and liberties. This Article argues that for Afghanistan's Constitution to be internally consistent and to preserve the rights guaranteed by Article 27, Article 130 should be interpreted to apply only to civil cases-not criminal cases. In particular, this Article maintains that the practice of invoking Article 130 in criminal cases stems from a misunderstanding of the language within the provision itself, language that states, " [I] f there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws about a case . . . within the limits set by this Constitution." 11 Article 130 of the Constitution states that the Hanafi Fiqh should be applied within the limits of the Constitution; Article 27, which states that no act shall be considered crime without determined by statute, is in itself a limit. Hence, a case does not necessarily include all civil, criminal, and commercial cases. Criminal cases could and must be excluded from the interpretation of Article 130.
As a solution to this problem, this Article recommends initiating supplemental training for judges on how to interpret Articles 27 and 130. In addition, it recommends that the Supreme Court of Afghanistan issue a decree clarifying that Article 130 applies only to civil and commercial cases.
Part I of this Article focuses on the internationally recognized meaning of the principle of legality and related doctrines, such as the rule of lenity, narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, and nonretroactivity. Part II aims to provide the necessary background for understanding how and why upholding the principle of legality proves so difficult in Afghanistan. Part III explains how the principle of legality appears in the different sources of law that govern Afghanistan, including Islam, the Afghan Constitution, Afghan Codes, and treaties. Finally, Part IV illustrates possible steps to be taken in order to strengthen the principle of legality in Afghanistan, providing some recommendations that might solve the problems of the inconsistency in the application and interpretations of Article 130, 190 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 185 including creating a committee charged with developing secondary sources to model educated and reasonable interpretations of statutes and constitutional provisions.
I UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The principle of legality originates from the belief that all people deserve to know what conduct constitutes a crime and what punishment flows from a conviction for that crime. 12 The typical Latin phrase associated with this principle is "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege," meaning that there is no crime or punishment without a statute. 13 Under this principle, holding an individual liable for committing an act that was not expressly prohibited when the act was committed is neither fair nor just.
14 However, after a law is enacted, all individuals are obliged to obey the law whether they are aware of the law or not. This means that no person or entity is superior to the law, and ignorance of a law is not a defense, except in the very rare case of misinterpretation of law.
15
The principle of legality primarily concerns notice: an actor should have the reasonable ability to know whether his or her behavior is criminal. 16 It is a foundational concept that underlies fair trial standards and is intended to assure the rule of law in criminal proceedings.
17
The principle keeps the authority of defining crimes with the legislature, prevents judges and law enforcement agencies from misusing their power, and distinguishes criminal actions from lawful actions.
18
The principle also prevents arbitrary prosecution.
19
Germany provides an instructive example of the principle of legality in national law. In German, the term Rechtsstaat means "rule 2017]
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20
As part of this doctrine, Rechtsstaat limits the power of the state in order to protect citizens form the arbitrary exercise of law enforcement agencies. To ensure the uniform application of law, the German legal system limits the discretion of its prosecutors through the principle of legality. Rechtsstaat is practiced in conjunction with mandatory prosecution.
21
Accordingly, a German prosecutor is obliged to prosecute a criminal case when sufficient factual evidence shows that a crime has been committed. 22 Mandatory prosecution has been part of the criminal procedure code since its adoption in 1877. 23 While recent amendments give prosecutors more discretionary decision-making authority, there continues to be strict oversight of prosecutors to ensure that they follow Rechtsstaat.
24
As another example, the French civil law system reflects the principle of legality through its requirement that the legislative branch promulgate a statue prior to enforcement entities holding conduct criminally liable.
25
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen enshrines the principle that everyone deserves to know which act constitutes a crime and which specific law applies to an alleged crime.
26
The French system emphasizes that any prohibition of an act must be announced and enacted in statutory form, nullum crimen sine praevia lege scripta.
27
Legal systems that follow this principle of legality agree that judges and law enforcement agencies should not punish a defendant arbitrarily or retroactively.
28
Most importantly, a person should not be convicted of a crime if that action was not a crime at the time it 20 occurred; so, criminalizing an act or omission prior to enactment of criminality through the legislative branch is strongly prohibited.
29
Judicial temperance is thus inherent in the principle of legality. While interpreting penal statues, judges should give leniency to the defendant and must not convict a person without a clear and reasonable justification. 30 Further, no entity, including judges, can consider an act to be a crime based on opinion or public welfare arguments, nor can judges sentence a person to a punishment that is not mentioned in penal statutes based on the same reasons.
31
The principle of legality helps to prevent both the initiation of a criminal case on one's own initiative or the seeking of retributive justice. 32 Instead, it requires that prosecution of a criminal, from the allegation of criminal behavior to the execution of a final decision of the authorized court, shall be based on the enacted laws.
33
Implementation of the principle of legality has two important legal effects: a narrow interpretation of penal statutes and preventing retroactivity of criminal law.
34
Broad interpretations lead to the creation of new offenses after conduct has occurred: a retroactive criminalization of behavior.
35
In order to stifle broad interpretations of law, the principle of legality requires that a legislature pass penal statutes without ambiguities and vague rules.
36
Other judicial doctrines weigh in favor of a strict application of the principle of legality. The classic doctrine of lenity, expressly adopted into the Rome Statute, 37 requires that ambiguous criminal laws should be interpreted in favor of the defendant. Article 22 (2) of the Rome Statute clarifies that the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In fact, the classic school of criminal law opposes the analogical interpretation of criminal law.
38
According to this school, analogical interpretation 29 The statute used the terms "abominable and detestable crime against nature," which the court held that the language was not clear for an average person of common intelligence. 44 If the legislature intended to criminalize oral sex or only anal sex, then the statute should have included that specific language.
45
The void for vagueness doctrine is used as an instrument to support predictability and foreseeability in the interpretation of criminal law. In the sections that follow, this Article explains how the principle of legality and its related doctrines are expressed and interpreted in the Afghan legal context.
II LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF AFGHANISTAN
The complexities of Afghanistan's geography and religious, cultural, and political history have led to an equally complex legal landscape that incorporates various cultural traditions and religious perspectives. 59 As part of this complexity, the Afghan legal system reflects three different components: Sharia Law, Civil Law, and Customary Law. 60 Sometimes these components complement one another or overlap, and sometimes they contradict one another. 61 This section gives background needed to understand the complexities underlying the principle of legality in Afghanistan.
Throughout its history, the legal system of Afghanistan has been based on Islamic law and customary law.
62
In the late nineteenth century during the reign of King Abdurahman Khan, the codification process began, and state legal codes became the exclusive source of legal authority; nevertheless, these laws were still firmly based on Islamic Law. Islam has also traditionally held a prominent place in the constitutions of Afghanistan. 64 It has been considered the religion of the state not only in the 2004 Constitution, but also in the 1964 and 1977 Constitutions. 65 In accordance with the 1964 Constitution, the King was required to be a Muslim and the State was required to practice religious rites in accordance with Hanafi Fiqh (jurisprudence). 66 This constitution also required that no law should be passed in contradiction to the principles of Islam. 67 Similar provisions were included in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan. Moreover, Article 130 of the Constitution refers judges to Hanafi jurisprudence for guidance when there is no provision regarding the enacted laws. 68 However, similar to other countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Libya, Afghanistan also employs the structure of the civil law system.
A. The Relationship Between Islam and the Afghan Constitution and Codes
Islam has an important place in the laws of Afghanistan. It has played a central role in the country's history and in the formation of its national identity. Hence, all laws including criminal law are supposed to be passed in compliance with Sharia Law.
Indeed, the concept of "beliefs and provisions" opens the door to broad interpretations. 69 Under a broad interpretation, beliefs and provisions could refer not only to Sharia Law but also to the Hanafi Fiqh, and perhaps even to other Islamic law doctrine. With this language, the 2004 Constitution designed a legal system intertwined with Islam, incorporating the Hanafi school of jurisprudence by reference.
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The language of Article 3 and Article 130 have complex implications for separation of powers or checks and balances in Afghanistan. For example, the 2004 Constitution gives the legislative branch the authority to define criminal or civil offenses. And while executive decrees are considered lawful under the Constitution, they may be accepted or rejected or amended by the legislative branch. 71 Nevertheless, Article 130 limits this legislative power by directing the judiciary to Islamic sources outside of the control of the legislative branch; the legislative branch has no authority to change or amend Sharia Law, which independently criminalizes some acts and devises certain punishments. In the Afghan context, these two provisions contradict each other.
B. Court Structure and Judicial Training
To understand the complexities involved in varied interpretations of Article 130, one must understand the court structure in Afghanistan and how judges are trained. The Constitution of Afghanistan is the sole source of required qualifications for the judges on the Afghan Supreme Court. 78 Under Article 116 of the Constitution, the judiciary is an independent entity that consists of the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and preliminary or trial courts.
79
The Supreme Court is responsible for the administration of a court system consisting of 34 provincial courts and 408 primary courts throughout Afghanistan.
80
The court with the second-highest authority is the appellate court. The lowest court in the hierarchical structure of the Afghan court system is the primary court.
81
The Supreme Court is composed of nine judges including a Chief Justice, all of whom are required to have higher education in the laws or in Islamic jurisprudence, as well as demonstrate expertise in the judicial system of Afghanistan.
82
Thus, Supreme Court judges should have knowledge in both religious and statutory laws because the Afghan legal system is based on both Islamic law and statutory law; judges that lack training in either may not qualify as Supreme Court judges.
83
The criteria for appellate court and primary court judges are set forth in Article 81 of the Law on Organization and Structure of Judiciary Branch of the Republic of Afghanistan.
84
In accordance with Article 81, judges can come from one of three different educational backgrounds: "sharia school, religious school (Madrasa), 77 UNUDHR, supra note 1. 78 The Sharia school curriculum consists of Islamic law and jurisprudence; however, Sharia students also receive introduction to some subjects in national and international law. 86 In contrast, in "law schools," the curriculum focuses on statutory and international law, with some introduction to Sharia law and jurisprudence. 87 Students in religious schools, or Madrasas, study generally the religion of Islam.
88
Despite these discrepancies in educational background, each of these judges preform the same role in the judiciary, working in the same courts, as well as interpreting and applying the same laws.
As a way to supplement their legal education and prepare them for service in the judiciary, Afghanistan requires future judges to attend a judicial Stazh (practical course), a course that runs for two years.
89
While attending this course, all students are trained in the same classes and same subjects: civil code, penal code, criminal and civil procedure, fair trial standards, criminalistics, among other topics. 90 Later, while serving on the court, the judges also receive instruction through additional trainings and workshops.
91
These trainings attempt to equip the judges with both Sharia law and positive laws of the state.
III THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY UNDER AFGHAN LAW
This section explains how the principle of legality appears in the different sources of law that govern Afghanistan, including Islam, the Afghan Constitution, Afghan Codes, and treaties. 85 A. "We never punish until we have sent a messenger" 92 There are many verses of the Quran that appear to reflect the principle of legality and non-retroactivity of criminal law. For instance, the Quran states that "[w]e never punish until we have sent a messenger." 93 It also states "[n]ever did the lord destroy the townships. He had raised up in their mother (town) a messenger reciting unto them our revelations." 94 The Quran goes on to state that, "Allah has forgiven what is past, but whosoever commits it again, Allah will take retribution from him." 95 In addition, it emphasizes, "[l]et there be from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency." 96 Fundamentally, Sharia requires there should be no crime or punishment unless stated by a law prior to commitment of such forbidden conducts. 97 God does not impose punishment upon individuals until they are informed about the prohibited action through his messenger. 98 Indeed, Islamic, national, and international sources of law each individually exhibit this clear commitment to the principle of legality; however, this commitment is sometimes lost in in the complex reality of a mixed legal system, where these legal systems sometimes conflict or are susceptible to conflicting interpretations.
Id
B. Distinguishing Between Hudod, Qissas, Diat, and Tazir Crimes
In Islamic criminal justice system, all offenses are divided into three categories according to the severity of penalty and nature of the offence. In these, the discretion of punishment is left to the victim or his or her family.
102
Tazir literally means to prevent, to honor, to moderate, to avoid, and to assist. 103 Tazir are those crimes that are criminalized by the rulers. 104 The privilege of law making power given to Muslims is complementary, not absolute. Thus, the legislation should be in compliance with Sharia. 105 In Islam, Tazir crimes are crimes referenced generally in the Quran or the Hadiths, but for which neither source identifies or defines a punishment. 106 Under Islamic law, punishments for Tazir crimes are, therefore, determined at the discretion of the judge or ruler of the state. 107 Notably, there is no separate criminal court for hearing Hudod, Qissas, Diat or Tazir crimes in Afghanistan, and all courts and judges are qualified to hear all cases.
In contrast to Tazir offences, Hudod crimes encompass specific crimes against God, and these crimes have fixed punishments articulated in the Quran and the Sunnah.
108
Hudod crimes include adultery or fornication, theft, and apostasy, among some others.
109
The set punishments for these crimes include death by stoning, lashes, and amputations, depending on the crime.
110
In Hudod cases, because both the crimes and the respective punishments are considered in primary Islamic sources, judges exercise limited discretion, primarily limited to the intent of the defendant and the credibility of the evidence.
111
Qissas means "equality" or "equivalence". murder charges. For example, under this doctrine, a murder victim's closest relative has a right to kill the murderer, if the court deems it appropriate. Again, because this doctrine is defined and described in Islamic sources of law, judges have little discretion. Judges hear the case and are responsible to ensure the proper implementation of retaliation through convicting the defendant based on evidence.
113
The Islamic criminal justice system has clear rules and principles regarding Hudod, Qissas, and Diat crimes. For Hudod crimes, there are specified punishments; however, the punishments for Qissas and Diat crimes are left to the discretion of the victim and the victim's family. Families have the discretion to request punishment or to negotiate for compensation. 114 Notably, it is debated whether retaliation still occurs in modern Islamic countries. 115 For example, in Egypt, retaliation was practiced until the French Model Penal Code was adopted in 1883. 116 Both Hudod and Qissas crimes are sanctioned through specified rules and regulations of Sharia. In other words, the crimes and the punishment of these crimes are identified. Because Hudod crimes are severe, the procedural rules regarding the crimes are characterized by their stringent requirements of proof. Most of the time it is nearly impossible to prove the crime.
117
With Hudod crimes, punishments cannot be altered; thus, there is no minimum or maximum punishments attached to them. If someone commits a Hudod crime, he knows what the punishment will be. No one, including heads of state, legislature, or judges, can reduce or change the punishment for Hudod crimes. However, with Tazir crimes, there are grounds for general and specific pardon and such pardons can take place through the president or parliament.
In Afghanistan, inconsistencies and disagreements about the principle of legality are most evident in cases of Tazir crimes, primarily because of the relationship between Article 130 and Article 27 of the Constitution, as well as differing opinions about how those provisions should be interpreted. in effect, announcing that judges do not have absolute discretion to criminalize an act of Tazir. Instead, Tazir type crimes must be defined and adopted by the legislature.
A Historical View of Tazir Crimes
At the beginning of Islam, a state leader, the Caliph himself, would decide cases, without the assistance of courts.
121
It was during the caliphate of Umar (Radiya Allahu Anhu), 122 the second Caliph, that judges were appointed and justice before the law was considered an Islamic duty of judges.
123
These judges were considered delegates of the Caliph or governor of a province. At that time, judges were resolving many different kinds of disputes, "civil or criminal," according to the Quran and Sunnah. Specific instructions were given to judges, including many principles of Fiqh, describing crimes and punishments. For example, there was a Fiqh instruction to judges that extrapolation may be used from similar cases when there is no concrete rule in the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet on a matter.
125
Later during the Abbasids dynasty, additional schools of Islamic thought were established and gradually developed.
126
The Quran and Sunnah give discretion to the Caliph to make new laws in compliance 119 According to Awdah, Tazir offences are regulated by the text of Sharia alone, and it is a mistake to suggest that a judge has discretion or liberty to determine an action or omission as a crime and provide punishment for it.
137
Awdah explains that a judge is obligated to decide first whether the conduct constitutes a wrongdoing according to the language of the text of Sharia.
138
The judge should first look to a corresponding Tazir crime that is expressly prohibited in the Sharia law or jurisprudence, without specifying the exact punishment.
Some of these crimes include perjury, usury, obscenity, insult, bribery, unlawful entry into private dwellings, and espionage. 139 Because these acts are forbidden by Sharia, the authority is provided to an Islamic state's leader to deem the conduct criminal. Yet, Awdah maintains that a judge has the discretion to determine punishment for any of these wrongdoings, ranging from a warning to fines and imprisonment. In other words, the judge has substantial flexibility and authority regarding Tazir offences, which Awdah characterizes as sultah al-ikhtiyar (power to select) as opposed to sultah al-tahakkum (power to legislate at will). 140 An alternative view, championed by Mohammed Salam Madkoar, the former head of Islamic Law at the University of Cairo, argues that Sharia Law emphasizes the societal interest, so broad discretion should be given to judges to prevent evils in the future.
141
Neither judges nor any other organ of government enjoys unlimited power under Islamic law. Thus, granting to the judiciary unlimited discretion of criminalization and punishment of an act is not allowed. Instead, there are two alternative solutions that adopt an expansionist view of Tazir. First, the head of the state determines the upper limit of Tazir punishment. A second view of Tazir includes capital punishment, citing the well-known hadith (a collections of the sayings and doing of the Prophet Mohammad) wherein the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, addressed the believers, saying, 
Tazir in Modern Islamic States
In the era of applicable laws, the question arises whether criminal act or omission should be codified via parliament or whether it should be left to the discretion of judges to criminalize an act or omission. Various Muslim countries have different approaches to this matter. Saudi Arabia allows a judge to set Tazir crimes and punishments; 144 however, some restrict discretion to the punishment. In contrast, in 1983 Ayatollah Khomeiny ordered the Iranian Parliament to enact all Tazir for the purpose of the unification of the application of Tazir in courts. 145 Today, in almost all Islamic countries, judges do not hold discretion in Tazir crimes; the legislature has codified Tazir, in compliance with Sharia, in penal codes or statutes. 146 Moreover, as most Islamic countries have ratified a constitution, Tazir crimes would also be subject to any principle of legality articulated or adopted into those constitutions. 
Distinguishing Hudod Crimes from Tazir Crimes
Some crimes are considered both Hudod and Tazir, and similarly some crimes are considered both Qissas and Tazir. A sexual crime, which is essentially a Hudod crime, might be punished through Tazir when it doesn't rise to the level of intercourse. In addition, when the evidence in a case does not satisfy the strict requirements for Hudod proof, a person might be punished with Tazir.
150
For instance, the required evidence in fornication cases is confession from the defendant plus four credible eyewitnesses.
151
If that specific level of evidence is not available, the crime can still be classified as Tazir. However, under Tazir the punishment would be less severe than under Hudod.
Article 1 of Penal Code of Afghanistan specifies that Hudod cases must be decided in accordance with Hanafi Jurisprudence; however, the code does not specify the number of Hudod crimes that exist. There are seven Hodud crimes, four of which are punishable by death in special circumstances: adultery, apostasy, armed robbery, and rebellion.
152
Although these crimes have fixed punishment under Islamic law, various Islamic schools have differing points of view regarding available affirmative defenses and interpretations of the requirements for these crimes.
153
It is much more difficult to prove Hadd crimes because many Hadd crimes cannot be proven by circumstantial evidence. These high evidentiary safeguards and limitations on construction of the law decrease the chance of successful prosecution of Hadd punishments.
154
For instance, the required evidence to prove adultery is confession by the defendant plus four eyewitnesses.
155
The defendant can withdraw a confession any time before the execution of 149 Threshold is 10 Sharia Dirham, which is equivalent to approximately 4.5 grams gold or 31.5 grams of silver. 150 The witnesses must have good character and should have seen the crime as it happened. Providing false testimony regarding crime is punishable by eighty lashes. 157 In addition, Islamic schools do not accept the testimony of women in cases of adultery tried under Hadd. 158 Notably, unlike other Hudod crimes, apostasy can be proven by circumstantial evidence. 159 Although often harsh, the use of Hudod punishment does not violate the principle of legality because clear notice has been given to the people of society. Citizens already know the list of Hudod crimes and the punishments assigned to each crime. 160 The burden of proof is common knowledge as well. Hadd crimes, their punishments, and the burdens of proof are immutable, even to the judiciary.
a. Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Codes
The principle of legality is expressed through Article 27 of the Afghan Constitution, and Articles 2 and 3 of the 1976 Penal Code. As explained in the introduction to this Article, Article 27(2) of the Afghan Constitution states, "no person can be pursued, arrested or detained save in accordance with the provisions of law. In addition, no person can be punished except in accordance with the decision of a competent court and in conformity with the law adopted before the date of offence." 161 Articles 2 and 3 of the Penal Code echo the Afghan Constitution. Articles 2 and 3 state generally that no act shall be considered a crime, unless it is in accordance with statute. 162 No one can be punished but in accordance with the provisions of a statute that has been enacted before commitment of the act under reference. 
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to the Afghan Constitution evidence and all related documents shall be maintained separately from other evidence and documents. 164 In light of these provisions, law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities may not conduct any arrests, detention, or searches unless in accordance with specific, existing rules of criminal procedure. 165 In the following sections, this Article explains how the principle of legality and its related doctrine have been articulated in the various constitutions of Afghanistan.
(i) Before the 2004 Constitution
Article 64 of the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan required parliament to enact law in compliance with the principles of Islam. 166 Accordingly, judges had to base their decisions on the laws that were passed by parliament. 167 Hence, the Constitution required judges to decide only based on the enacted laws; however, in accordance with Article 102, the judges had discretion to refer to Hanafi jurisprudence when there were no statutes to cover the case before the judge. 168 The unconsolidated state of manuals of Fiqh and the diversity of opinions within Hanafi jurisprudence have created problems of inconsistency and unpredictability in court practices-courts rely on the views of different scholars within the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. This also leads to problems of the consistency of the Hanafi jurisprudence with the Constitution, which creates serious obstacles for judges to decide which one to prioritize.
The principle of legality was also expressly incorporated into the Constitution of 1964; in accordance with Article 26 of this Constitution, no action is considered a crime unless defined as a crime by an enacted law prior to the commission of the act. 169 Accordingly, no one shall be punished without the decision of an authoritative court 164 following the provisions of the enacted law, which had to have been promulgated prior to commitment of the offense.
170
The adoption of the principle of legality in the 1964 Constitution was ahead of its time; at that time, Afghanistan did not have any developed codified penal statutes. When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding ruling on an issue, the court's decisions shall be within the limits of this Constitution in compliance with basics principles of Hanafî jurisprudence and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner.
172
Under this Article, judges were allowed to apply the basic principles of Hanafi Fiqh to ensure justice; however, because the legislature had begun to enact statutes in the form of the Penal Code, there was a question of whether, because the legislature began to codify law, judges should not have the power to criminalize Tazir crimes.
(ii) 2004 Constitution and Current Penal Codes
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan provides individual rights of citizens in the second chapter. Included in these rights is the right to be informed of prohibited actions or omissions and their punishments. For example, Article 27 requires the government of Afghanistan to specify all crimes and the punishment of each crime in statutory laws; if there are no statutes regarding an action or omission, prosecution is considered illegal.
174
In short, there is no crime or punishment for conduct unless the law expressly forbids it.
Elsewhere in the Constitution, however, there is a significant retreat from the principles of Article 27. As explained above, Article 130 states that when there is no rule in the Constitution and statutory law regarding a specific case, Islamic law under the Hanafi School of 170 
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Jurisprudence may be invoked.
175
There is simply an unclear path to reconciling these two provisions, and one cannot help but notice that certain readings of them undermine the principle of legality. Nevertheless, as illustrated in the case discussions in the following section, criminal courts of Afghanistan frequently argue that this Article does in fact give them the discretion to convict and sentence defendants for Tazir crimes when there is no Penal Code provision.
C. How Judges Use Article 130 to Justify Punishments Under Tazir
The criminal courts of Afghanistan have used Article 130 of the Constitution to convict and punish defendants in more than a thousand criminal cases in which the judge relied on Hanafi jurisprudence. Examples of these cases include mundane activities like those involved in runaway cases, and the selling of Haram animals as meat. For each of these, there is no specific rule in the Penal Code that defines the act as a crime. Having not been formally recognized as a crime, there can be no attendant punishment assigned. Instead, the punishments handed out by judges are based on social norms and the demands of the people in the community. The following are some examples of Tazir cases in which the criminal courts justified their decisions on Article 130.
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Case of Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh
In October 2007, Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh, a student at Balkh University and a journalist for Jahan-e Naw (New World), was arrested for downloading and publishing materials "offensive to Islam." Kambakhsh had written criticism about certain Quranic verses about women. 179 He was accused of blasphemy. 180 The punishment for blasphemy varies among different schools of jurisprudence. Different schools take into consideration whether the perpetrator is Muslim or non-Muslim, or man or woman. Depending on the level of blasphemy, the punishment can be fines, imprisonment, flogging, amputation, hanging, or beheading. 181 For example, injuring or defiling places of worship with the intent to insult the religion might deserve fine or imprisonment, while use of derogatory remarks in respect of the prophet Mohammad might deserve death.
In Kambakhsh's case, local religious leaders demanded that he be executed. The Court virtually made two rulings in Kambakhsh's case. First the Court had to deem his act blasphemy, which is an offense to Islam under Tazir. This decision by the Court allowed it to apply Article 130 of the Constitution to sentence Kambakhsh using a Tazir punishment.
Dog Meat Case
There are many verses in Quran regarding Halal (permitted food) and explaining what meat would be considered Haram (food that is not permitted). One of the Hadith explaining these verses states that "Allah's Messenger is prohibited to eat: every beast of prey that has a canine tooth and every bird that has a claw."
186
Given that dogs have canine teeth, they are considered Haram under Islamic law. Because Haram is a crime against Islam, the Court justified a conviction and sentence for a Tazir crime under Article 130 when defendants were accused of selling dog meat.
The case arose when, in Herat province, police arrested three individuals who were accused of selling dog meat to people under the guise of sheep meat. The butchers association of Herat province and members of the community suggested harsh punishment for the defendants. They believed this action went against Islamic principles, and anyone who misused Islamic principles should be sentenced to the strongest punishment. They warned that if the government showed mercy or gave a lesser punishment, they would take action themselves and punish the individuals on their own.
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[Vol. 18, 185 was found to have only assisted with the crime and was, therefore, sentenced to only three-years imprisonment.
188
The Court justified this ruling under Article 130 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, which ostensibly gives the court broad discretion in cases like this where the conduct is considered evil or against Islam.
Runaway Cases
Despite the fact that delegates of the Lawyers' Union of Afghanistan have criticized practice of sentencing women to imprisonment in runaway cases, further instances in which Afghan courts have relied on Article 130 of the Constitution to prosecute young women and girls for having run away persists.
There are many reasons why a young person might run away from home, including leaving the family to seek marriage on one's own terms or escaping from domestic violence. According to the 2012 Human Rights Watch report, up to 70 percent of the approximately 700 female prisoners in Afghanistan have been imprisoned for running away, most of who fled because of forced marriage or domestic violence.
189
In Pul-Charkhi prison, 20 out of 80 women in detention were convicted, with sentences of up to 14 years imprisonment, for running away from home.
190
While Islam may not expressly prohibit running away from home, it is considered to run counter to Islamic principles. This is so because, in Afghanistan, running away is presupposed to indicate crimes like adultery and prostitution. Neither is "running away" a crime under the Afghan Penal Code. Yet, law enforcement authorities often arrest, jail, and even prosecute girls for running away, usually qualifying the charge as "intention" to commit adultery (zina) which is a crime under the Penal Code as well. 
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Supreme Court of Afghanistan issued guidance about runaway cases to the criminal courts.
192
The Supreme Court confirmed that running away, even in cases of abuse, "could cause crimes like adultery and prostitution and is against Sharia principles." 193 The Court determined that the act is "prohibited and prosecutable based on discretionary punishment" because the behavior could be classified as Tazir.
194
The following are examples of how the courts use the language of Article 130 to convict individuals of crimes that are not codified.
In one case, a man from Logar province of Afghanistan married his 16-year-old daughter to an elderly man. 195 Because of this situation, the daughter ran away with a boy to another province of Afghanistan. 196 The primary court sentenced her to seven years imprisonment and transferred her to a juvenile correction center in Kabul. 197 In another case, as reported by Human Rights Watch, a 16-year-old girl fell in love with a school friend's brother. The boy asked her family if they would allow him to marry their daughter; however, her family refused. The boy's mother suggested that the girl run away with the boy, which would force her father to agree to the marriage. She did not agree to run away at the time, but later her father arranged to marry her with another boy. Because of her father's decision, she decided to run away with her lover. 198 In 2011, they ran away to the boy's cousin's house in a different region. After fleeing, she called her brother to tell her father that she ran away. Her brother told her to return and said that her family would finally let her to marry the boy.
199
They decided to return, but at a checkpoint the police realized that they were not married and arrested them both. The girl was convicted for running away and sentenced to two years in a juvenile facility. The boy was released, Because of growing criticism regarding charging women and girls with running away, despite an abiding disdain in the culture for the conduct, the way of charging these women has shifted toward attempted zina.
202
The assumption and justification for this classification is that women who run away without their male relatives must have attempted to have sex. 203 Accordingly, when a young woman has been arrested in a runaway case, the police sometimes order virginity tests to determine whether the girl was engaged in recent sexual intercourse. 204 The court then relies on the results of those tests as evidence. 205 These exams are ordered as a matter of course, without the consent of girls, and some girls are subjected to multiple gynecological exams. 206 Prosecution of runaway cases has been criticized by local human rights activists and by international observers, including the UN mission to Afghanistan. 207 UNAMA and the civil societies recommend that the president of Afghanistan and the Supreme Court issue a decree to stop prosecution of these cases.
208
As a result, on April 11, 2012, the Attorney Generals' Office issued a directive stating that "running away" is not a crime under penal statutes and should not be prosecuted. 209 The directive states that:
A circulation must be prepared and shared with all relevant prosecution offices in the center and provinces and the prosecutors should be instructed not to prepare unjustifiable case files regarding running away cases that have not been criminalized under Afghanistan laws and cannot be heard by courts and refrain from conducting baseless investigations. Other circumstances where people run away to commit any other crime are not covered by this instruction. The issue is being communicated to you so that you can
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Defending This text clarifies that running away must not be prosecuted, but still it leaves the gap for misuses with the inclusion of the exception: "Other circumstances where people runaway to commit any other crime are not covered."
211
In addition, the international interveners also asked the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to clarify whether running away because of domestic violence would constitute a crime. As a result, the high council of Supreme Court 212 issued a decree that states:
There is a difference between being a runaway and committing a crime. The action of those who leave home because of family violation and go to judiciary, law enforcement organizations, legal aid organizations, or their relatives' home does not constitute crime. A large number of girls because of family violation are living in shelters; therefore, running away in this situation must not be prosecuted. However, running away for the purposes of moral crimes or other purposes considered crime shall be prosecuted. In this case the law enforcement agencies must not use the term "runaway." Rather, they must find the description for the committed act form in the statutory laws. Courts and the attorney general office shall use the specific term for the committed crime and avoid the term "runaway." This decree was sent to all lower level courts, which were directed to apply it by January 13, 2013.
214
Despite these decrees, individuals are still prosecuted for running away from home. Just recently in 2015, four girls--two sisters, their relative, and a friend, all decided to run away from home together because of domestic violence. They bought airline tickets and spent the night at their friend's home. The next day, police arrested them at the Kabul National airport, where they were trying to fly to another province of Afghanistan. 215 2017]
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This Article maintains that the controversy persists primarily because of discrepancies in judicial education and societal attitudes, and that in order to increase accuracy, consistency, and reliability in criminal cases, the Afghan government must implement more judicial training on the relationship between Islam and the Afghan Penal Code. As part of this cause, the government must support an effort to develop a system of secondary sources, like annotated codes, legal encyclopedias, and treatises, to help shape future practice and bring more stability and consistency to judicial interpretation and rule of law. In addition, Afghan legislators should emulate the approaches of Egypt and Iran and amend the Penal Code to clarify that all potentially criminal actions associated with Tazir fall under the Penal Code, and that when there is no provision describing an offense, none is recognized or punishable through the legal system. If society deems certain behavior criminal, then the legislature must pass legislation to that effect before anyone can be convicted or punished for it.
A. Social Norms Affecting Interpretation and the Egyptian and Iran
Model Under Islamic law, social norms play an important role in a judge's determination of the need for criminal sanctions for Tazir. Mohammed Salam Madkoar makes the following observation:
Tazir punishments vary according to the circumstances. They change from time to time and from place to place. They vary according to the gravity of the crime and the extent of the criminal disposition of the criminal himself. Tazir crimes are acts that are punished because the offender disobeys God's law and word. Tazir crimes can be punished if they harm the social interest. Shar'iah Law places an emphasis on the social or public interest. The assumption of the punishment is that a greater "evil" will be prevented in the future if you punish this offender now.
222
This relationship between legal norms and social norms is inherent in the concept of Tazir. In most Islamic law cases, legal norms are applied in compliance with social norms. For instance, punishing a thief involves applying an existing law that criminalizes the conduct, the legal norm, and the punishment comports with public scorn for the act, the social norm. However, the perceived need for action under Tazir arises when the social norm opposes conduct where there is no 222 Id.
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[Vol. 18, 185 established legal norm. In runaway cases and dog meat cases, for example, the legal norm would have required the release of the offenders because their actions were not criminalized by state law; nevertheless, the social norm demanded punishment because the actions offended the sensibilities of society because the prosecution is usually prepared on the basis that running away is considered preparation for adulatory. Generally, the purpose of Hudod crimes and their punishments in Islamic society is the protection of public interest, property, security, and the moral value of Muslim society.
223
In contemporary Islamic states, the legislative branch struggles to protect social interests by codifying Tazir offences with appropriate punishment. 224 A legislature in an Islamic country may criminalize an act if the public interest demands it, and the level of public interest may also affect the limit of discretion of the judge when considering a Tazir crime.
225
One problem with moving in the direction of codification of Tazir crimes and clarification about judicial discretion in criminal cases is the administrability. The Egyptian criminal justice system, for example, which integrated Islamic jurisprudence into its statutory law, could be a good model for Afghan reform on this issue. The Egyptian reform could be considered in line with both the international human rights conventions that Egypt has signed and Islam. 
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The government of Afghanistan could invite Afghan's Islamic scholars along with Islamic scholars from other countries to draft statutes and include all, or reasonably all, actions or omissions that they think constitute a crime under Tazir jurisprudence. After the ratification of that law, it will be clear for everybody what act or omission is prohibited and what punishment is lawful. A concerted effort to employ the principle of legality would help Afghanistan's courts avoid inconsistency, a lack of foreseeability, and other injustices that arise when the principle is disregarded. Generally, the rule of law in Afghanistan would benefit from a move to eliminate gaps in the judicial system. A unification of the law and principles of justice, considering the diversity within the Hanafi jurisprudence, should be done with the consideration of all sources of reference in the Islamic nation.
228
B. Addressing Differences in Judicial Education
As explained above, those who graduate from Sharia schools tend to believe that Article 130 gives them broad discretion to punish all actions considered evil under Sharia-even for conduct that has no specified punishment under the Sharia or criminal sanction under statutory law-what they would consider to be Tazir crimes. 229 In fact, some Sharia graduates go so far as to argue that there is no need for statutory laws at all because there are solutions for all cases in Sharia.
230
These judges try to solve all cases, including Tazir cases, in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence (the Fiqh). They maintain that Islamic jurisprudence provides them with broad discretion, discretion that can sometimes even result in a violation of a defendant's statutory or constitutional rights. They also emphasize the language of Article 2 of the Penal Code, which seems to take this rule even further, stating that "[n]o act is considered a crime unless specified by the provision of the law." 233 Article 3 of the Penal Code also lends support to this position by stating that "[n]o one may be punished except under the rulings of a law that have been put into force prior to perpetration of the alleged crime." 234 As a result, when judges, who graduate from law schools, hear cases that could otherwise be classified as Tazir, they consider the statutory law and observe the rights of defendant as described by statutory law, and they do not tend to refer to Hanafi jurisprudence to fill any perceived gap.
The root of this inconsistency between the perceptions of judges stems not just from differences in types of legal training, but also from a lack of professionalism and inadequate legal education, in general. In fact, some judges have obtained their positions in Afghan courts despite a lack of higher education of statutory law or Sharia law. Instead, they are graduates of Madrassas or high school. As a result, when they approach complex legal problems and laws, they are not able to do the analysis or find the relevant provisions.
The aforementioned Kambakhsh case provides a good example of this lack of professionalism. In the Kambakhsh case, the prosecutor demanded punishment in accordance with Article 347 of the Penal Code, a crime accompanied by a prison sentence of no more than five years or a fine. Despite this relatively moderate sentence, the criminal court sentenced Kambakhsh to the death penalty. This case illustrates that the judiciary and attorney general's office need a way to integrate more effective educational programing into its legal training systems across the board.
One of the causes of this disparity in education is simply access to legal materials. In some rural areas of Afghanistan, there is even a shortage of copies of the enacted laws. In addition, there is little access to the Internet or any other means to find and consult legal sources. As such, this article recommends that the government of Afghanistan, with the help of NGOs, consider this problem and take steps to ensure that judges and law enforcement agencies have access to the materials they need to make correct decisions under the law.
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Both judicial training and access to legal sources such as statutes, bylaws, the constitution, treaties, conventions, legal encyclopedias, annotated statutes, and so on, is necessary to improve the quality of trials in Afghanistan. Providing materials would not work without qualitative legal education because access to materials will not solve the problem if people do not have the education or ability to understand those materials. Similarly, legal education without access to the sources would be detrimental to the quality of the education. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many judges and prosecutors lack the skills and experience to analyze more complex law in the first place. 235 This lack of skill can lead to unfair justice and harsh punishments. 236 As such, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court of Afghanistan provide more educational programs to the judges and instruct them on how to interpret provisions of law that support justice in the best manner. Further, the courts should encourage religious leaders and jurists to campaign for empowering the principle of legality and the rule of law to ensure the liberty of Afghanistan's people.
However, while some legal educational training has been held by NGOs for Afghan judges and prosecutors, these programs were short and for limited number of judges. Mostly, in such programs, the NGOs give the judge and prosecutors legal manuals, which are beneficial, but only a few judges and prosecutors can take benefit of such programs. 237 Hence, a large number of judges and prosecutors still need training and access to legal sources. For instance, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and International Law developed many manuals on civil, criminal, procedural, and constitutional issues and held some training for the judges and prosecutors. short-term training program cannot solve the problem unless the program is extended to every province and district court and general attorney offices and provide them with sources that help to analyze the statute and find the appropriate provisions.
239
Even if the government of Afghanistan provides collections of statutes to the prosecutors and judges, this alone would not solve the problem. Access to materials that assist with interpretation, such as annotated statutes, legal encyclopedias, and treatises on constitutional interpretation would be an essential step toward supporting consistency among the decisions of judges and courts. These sources could also help lawyers, and prosecutors in particular, to normalize which cases they bring and how they charge.
Secondary sources like annotated statutes, legal encyclopedias, and treatises on constitutional interpretation could provide important commentary on how a law evolved, what is means, and how it should be applied in future cases. In addition, it could be helpful to create an annotated statute with illustrations, similar to the format modeled by the Restatement series from the United States, where the committee could show how the law would apply to different hypothetical scenarios.
To begin the process of creating these sources, the Supreme Court could appoint a body of respected professionals, lawyers, judges, and academics from both law and Sharia schools. They should be tasked with coming to some consensus on interpretations of the individual provisions of the code, and when necessary, they should offer different, but well-reasoned interpretations reflective of different schools of thought. At the same, however, these groups of experts should follow a reasonable interpretation of the law. These resources would help prosecutors, judges, and even defense lawyers to understand the meaning of statutory and constitutional previsions.
To achieve this goal, a panel of respected professionals and lawyers as well as academics in law and Sharia schools should be established to supplement, by collaboration and cooperation, the modest materials that have previously been offered by NGOs and academics. In interpreting the Fiqh, judges should give priority to the statutes that have the most usage in the courts of Afghanistan, especially those that have created problems because of controversial interpretations and inferences that arise from confusion over the 239 Much of the information in this respect is based on the direct experience of the author.
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225 Toward a Unified Interpretation of Article 130 to the Afghan Constitution relationship between the Constitutional provisions discussed here, as well as many other provisions of the Penal Code. Investing in legal resources would not only increase the knowledge of judges, prosecutors, and other practitioners, but also, the process of working together to interpret and comment on the Penal Code may reveal weaknesses and ambiguities in the statutory provisions themselves. Developing these sources not only will require cooperation among the judiciary, academia, and the government, but also will necessitate time and expense, which may fall outside the capacity of the Afghan government on its own. Many international NGOs have previously assisted the judiciary and the Attorney General's Office in the legal capacity building arena. While on the financial end, this effort could be assisted by NGOs, strong leadership from the Supreme Court and knowledgeable and respected lawyers and academics would be needed for the sources to gain respect and prominence.
This would be an ambitious project, to say the least. And while finding the financial resources to make this project work may be challenging, finding consensus among the perceptions of Sharia experts with law professionals will likely prove to be even more difficult. Participants in the project would need strong encouragement, not only to work together, but also to find consensus for the benefit of the public interest and, ultimately, for compliance with Islamic principles and the development of rule of law in Afghanistan. It will require strong leadership and commitment from all participating constituents.
Using its power to interpret the Constitution, the Supreme Court should issue a decree that should clarify the meaning and scope of Article 130 of the Constitution. More specifically, it is important that the Court clarify that Article 130 only applies to civil and commercial cases. The application of Article 130 to criminal cases undermines rule of law and the principle of the legality of crimes and punishments.
CONCLUSION
The internationally recognized principle of legality leads to a proper balance between the rights of individuals and the needs of society. In Islam, the principle of legality requires that no action or omission shall be considered Hudod, Qissas, Diat, or Tazir unless clearly forbidden by law prior to the committed action in question.
226
OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 185 This principle is also embedded in Article 27 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, which requires prosecution of criminal cases strictly in compliance with law. It also obliges judges and law enforcement agencies to avoid arbitrariness while prosecuting criminal cases. In Afghanistan, too often judges disregard the principle of legality when it comes to Tazir cases, cases where there is no statutory provision that describes conduct society condemns. In such cases, Afghan courts have relied on the Hanafi jurisprudence as directed under Article 130 of the Constitution. Hanafi jurisprudence therefore serves to fill the gap when there is no statute or constitutional provision on point. Despite the language of Article 130 itself, this practice is questionable in criminal cases because of the presence of the principle of legality in the Afghan Constitution and in Islam. However, the criminal courts of Afghanistan have long been relying on Article 130 to prosecute criminal cases that the legislature has not described-cases of runaway, selling Haram meat, and blasphemy, among others.
This Article argues that this way of legislating, ex post facto, sits uncomfortably with a government that is supported by an international community that subscribes to the principle of legality. Prosecutions under Article 130 of the Constitution have at times caused the international community to threaten to stop their support.
The persistence of this inconsistency in the criminal justice system of Afghanistan stems from the lack of professionalism, access to quality legal education and materials, and different interpretations of law. Thus, this Article recommends initiating supplemental training for judges on the meaning of Articles 27 and 130. In addition, it recommends that the Supreme Court of Afghanistan issue a decree clarifying that Article 130 concerns only civil and commercial cases.
